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Abstract—Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) for smart city
applications can be widely deployed, but they can also be
vulnerable to be compromised by outsider attackers. It is
therefore critical that the disseminated information is secured in
terms of its confidentiality, availability and authenticity. Many
key management schemes have been proposed to guarantee the
aforementioned requirements and the most popular depend on
the location of the sensor to generate the required credentials.
This paper presents a new location-dependent key management
protocol, called the location-dependent key management pro-
tocol with random selected cell reporters (LKMP-RSCR). In
this protocol, the generated report of an event must contain a
third level of endorsement handled by a set of cell reporters
to be accepted by the sink. As a result, the adversary needs to
compromise all endorsement nodes in addition to the entire set
of cell reporters to generate a fraudulent report from a specific
region. A mathematical analysis is presented to evaluate the
LKMP-RSCR and in contrast to existing LEDS and MKMP
schemes, our new scheme shows a significant improvement
in terms of data confidentiality, authenticity, computation and
communication cost. Revocation algorithms for compromised
nodes and cells are also presented to overcome the possible
consequences of node compromising.
Index Terms—Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), Smart Cities,
Location-Dependent Key Management System, Optimization,
End-to-End Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS sensor networks are well suited for mon-itoring small and low-cost sensors that can be de-
ployed over a wide terrain where resources are limited
[1]. Hence, data security is absolutely essential and so
cryptographic techniques are employed to ensure security
requirements, such as confidentiality, availability and authen-
ticity [2]. Whatever technique is used, particular security
credentials are required to be stored inside each node and
a key management system (KMS) is needed in order to
generate and distribute these credentials. However, the scarce
resources of a WSN mean that most KMS approaches used
in conventional wireless networks are infeasible [3]–[5]. To
solve this problem, most proposed solutions are based on the
pairwise construction of keys between each node and others
in its vicinity after the completion of the deployment process
*Harith Fakhrey and Yasir Al-Mathehaji are staff members with the
University of Baghdad in Iraq and sponsored by the Iraqi MoHESR to study
his Ph.D.
[6], [7]. As a result, hop-by-hop security is used to protect
data secrecy in WSNs where the majority of communication
occurs between each node and other nodes rather than direct
correspondence between each node and the sink. On the
other hand, for WSNs deployed in smart city applications,
such as road surveillance [8], traffic management [9] fire
detection and healthcare monitoring, this is not the case.
In such applications, the dominant communication pattern
occurs only between each node in the event region and
the sink and communication-pattern-oriented node capture
attacks might risk a hop-by-hop security design [10]. Con-
sequently, the confidentiality, availability and authenticity
of the data may be affected. To solve this problem, many
schemes are proposed to secure end-to-end communication
as a crucial requirement in recent WSN applications [11]–
[13]. In [14], the authors proposed a location-dependent key
management protocol for a WSN, where a set of cell reporters
were randomly selected by the base station to improve cell
security. However, the protocol in [14] is not optimal and
in this paper, an improved design of the location-dependent
key management protocol is presented, which addresses the
following issues:
1) Computational cost and data confidential-
ity/authenticity
2) An investigation into the optimum number of cell
reporters.
3) A revocation scheme for the compromised nodes/cells.
4) A mathematical analysis of the communication cost.
Hence, this protocol provides data protection inside a WSN
used for smart city applications in terms of data confidential-
ity, availability and authenticity.
A. Related Work
When an event happens inside a monitored region, a group
of n nodes around the event are assumed to be able to detect it
and then generate an event report. A collaborative signature
created by a threshold number of e (1 ! e ! n) nodes
validate the generated report. Otherwise, the intermediate
cells and sink block any report that does not contain a valid
endorsement. Based on this scheme, a few approaches have
been proposed in the last decade. First, an interleaved hop-
by-hop authentication (IHA) scheme [15] has been proposed
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to verify the generated reports in a deterministic fashion.
The statistical en-route filtering SEF [16] uses a probabilistic
approach in order to filter out fake reports. However, both
IHA and SEF suffer from the same drawback where the
compromising of n nodes results in no protection. To over-
come this problem, location-based resilient secrecy (LBRS)
[17] adopts two techniques: location-binding key generation
and location-guided key selection. As a result, the usage of
endorsement keys is limited to the region where the event
occurs, which leads to the thwarting of attacks that globally
use the credentials of compromised nodes. However, LBRS
does not satisfy the data authenticity requirement since the
compromising of n nodes inside a particular area might
enable the adversary to create a fake event in that area.
Additionally, data availability is not guaranteed where it
is vulnerable to selective forwarding and report disruption
attacks.
As an enhancement to the aforementioned schemes,
location-dependent end-to-end data security (LEDS) has been
proposed [10]. In this scheme, the terrain served by a
WSN is divided into several cells by a virtual grid. Within
each cell, both a node key and cell key are derived by
each node individually, depending on their location and cell
center location respectively. All generated reports contain
an endorsement generated by a threshold number of nodes
and the bogus reports are filtered out. It is clear that LEDS
has notable advantages such as guaranteeing data availability,
limited influence of node-compromising attacks and end-to-
end security. However, the WSN size is assumed to be fixed
and without any revocation scheme to overcome problems
caused by the compromised nodes. Moreover, the node
localization technique is infeasible due to its dependence on
robots which is not applicable [18].
The multi-BS key management protocol (MKMP) [18]
is a recent scheme inspired by LEDS. It shows an en-
hancement in terms of coverage and data security, power
consumption and storage cost. In addition, MKMP presents
a distributed key revocation scheme to solve compromised
node problems. However, MKMP has the same disadvantages
as LEDS in terms of node-compromising consequences. In
both approaches, compromising a threshold amount of nodes
(e) leads to an increase of the entire cell capturing probability.
Consequently, a fake report can easily be generated by the
adversary inside that cell, which would then be accepted
by the sink without being dropped by intermediate nodes.
Also, both schemes are challenged by a high communication
overhead caused by bidirectional multi-hop communication
between each particular cell and the BS, in addition to
the computational cost caused by the frequent derivation of
authentication keys and route set-up.
B. Contribution
Our proposed scheme has two novel contributions:
• The presence of cell reporters enhances data security
by increasing the difficulty of generating a malicious
report by an adversary and decreasing the impact of
compromising a certain number of nodes in the network.
• The inclusion of a hybrid communication scheme in
the WSN is assumed, so that data transmitted by the
BS to a particular node in the network is accomplished
by a single hop mechanism. Conversely, data sent in
the reverse direction is assumed to be transmitted by a
multi-hop mechanism. This criterion ensures:
– A decrease in communication overhead, where the
packets sent by the BS are transmitted directly to
each node without flooding the entire network.
– Load balance in computational cost between sensor
nodes and the BS, where some credentials are
generated by the BS then disseminated to each
node. Moreover, the computations related to routing
will be implemented by the BS rather than each
group of nodes.
This paper is organized as follows: The LKMP-RSCR
protocol is discussed in section II. A security analysis of
our system is discussed in section III. The communication
and computation cost is analysed in section IV and an
optimization analysis for the number of cell reporters is given
in section V. Finally, conclusions are given in section VI.
II. PROPOSED SCHEME: THE LKMP-RSCR PROTOCOL
A. System Assumptions
The LKMP-RSCR protocol is assumed to be employed
over a wide area of a smart city of a predetermined size and
shape, monitored using a large-scale WSN comprising N
limited resource nodes and a sink with unlimited resources,
hereafter known as a base station (BS). This unit is respon-
sible for data collection, control of both report verification
and en-route filtering and the origin of requests sent to all
nodes. The BS is assumed to be able to cover most sensor
nodes in the monitored region as shown in Fig. 1. The
served region is represented as a virtual grid of N ′ cells.
All cells are assumed to have a similar number of sensor
nodes that are in communication coverage of all other sensor
nodes and are able to estimate their positions using secure
localization schemes, such as [19]–[21]. It is also assumed
that all elements in the network (nodes and BS) have a unique
public identity (name) and a private identity (ID).
B. Threat Model
The system is assumed to be secure during the boot-
strapping interval, a short period after the deployment of
all elements, then the attacker is assumed to be able to
capture randomly selected nodes and compromise their se-
curity credentials. On the other hand, the same adversary
has no opportunity to compromise the BS due to its rigid
security which prevent its facilities from being compromised
or cloned. When a node is compromised, the attacker is
assumed to be able to inject, drop, eavesdrop, alter, or
retransmit packets. However, the attacker has no access to
the uncaptured nodes.
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C. Notation and Terms
In our study, the following definitions are of significant
importance:
• K: An initial master key used as a seed to derive other
keys
• (x0, y0): The BS location
• ∆: The side length of each cell
• t: The number of authentication cells di : i = 1, 2...t
• p: A prime number
• (xc, yc)): The center location of cell (c)
• (xa, ya)): The location of a node (a)
• ∥: The operation of concatenation
• H : A Hash function
• IDa: Identity of each particular node (a) which is
known by the BS
• ts: A recent time slot
• KLcin: An initial cell key
• KBa S A unique key shared between each node (a) and
the BS
• Kdic : An authentication key derived by the BS and
shared between cell mates in cell c and cell mates in
the authentication cell di
• KLc: The cell key
• EncK{M}: Encryption of a message M using key K
• MACK{M}: The message authentication code of a
message M calculated over the key K
• e: A threshold number of endorsement nodes required
to generate a legitimate report
• T : A predefined cell reporter validity
• N : Total nodes in the network
• N ′: Number of cells in the network
• n: Number of nodes of each cell
• z: Number of cell reporters
• λ: Packet size
• PC{e|z}: The probability of compromising a cell in
terms of data confidentiality
• Pauth{e|z}: The probability of compromising a cell in
terms of data authenticity
• The report forward route between a particular cell (c)
and the BS contains all cells traversed by a virtual line
between them as shown in Fig. 1, denoted as dark-grey
cells. The highlighted sequence is listed based on the
position according to the BS.
• Report authentication cell: A particular cell di belongs
to the forward report path of cell (c). Its location relative
to (c) or the last authentication cell is t+1 cells as shown
by the light-grey cells depicted in Fig. 1. However, there
is no authentication cell in the case of a short report
authentication route less than t+ 1 cells.
D. Setup Phase
Each particular node (a) is preloaded with the following
parameters {K, (x0, y0), IDa,∆, t, p}. Depending on their
clocks and the application requirements, the setup phase time
is divided into multiple identical time slots ts to ensure
R
BS
r
(x0,y0)
: Base Station
: Sensor Node
Report Authenitication Cells d
i
10
8
6 4
2
Report Forward Root
Figure 1: Illustration of system construction shows report
forward route and authentication cells for a WSN with n ≃ 3
and t = 2 [14]
the freshness of security credentials derivations. Using its
location and the BS location as a reference point, the node
excludes the center location of its cell. Based on these data,
the remaining credentials are derived as shown in Algorithm-
1. All nodes in each particular cell create a list of its
Algorithm 1 Derivation of security credentials inside each
node (a) during the setup phase
Input: K, (x0, y0), ts,∆, (xa, ya)
Kts ← K∥ts
xc ← 0.5
⌈
xa−x0
∆
⌉
, yc ← 0.5
⌈
ya−y0
∆
⌉
KLcin ← H(Kts∥(xc, yc)
return Kts, (xc, yc),KLcin
neighboring nodes, hereafter known as cell-mates, which is
sent by each sensor node to the BS. This process is illustrated
in Algorithm 2.
The message {LIST }a is sent by each node (a) to the
BS using a cell-by-cell method and the BS then follows
the steps shown in Algorithm 3 to verify the received data.
In this algorithm, receiving a message sent by different
nodes in the cell (c) via multiple paths means c contains no
malicious nodes. However, if a malicious node is detected,
a revocation scheme is implemented by calling Algorithm
(4) or Algorithm (5) to revoke nodes and cells listed in
SusbNodes, SusbCells respectively as shown in section
(II-F) to overcome these effects. All correspondence from the
BS to any node (a) is implemented directly via a single hop
scheme due to the wide coverage property of the BS. An
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Algorithm 2 Creation and broadcasting of cell-mate list of
each node (a)
Input: IDa, ts, (xa, ya), (xc, yc), (x0, y0),KLcin
a→ All cell-mates inside: EncKLcin{IDa, ts, (xc, yc)}
{CellMateList}a ≡ φ
for all cell-mates do
ACK → a
if ACK is valid then
Update {CellMateList}a
end if
end for
KBSa ← H(K∥IDa∥(x0, y0))
{LIST }a ← {((xc, yc), {CellMateList}a,KLcin}
a→ BS: EncKBS
a
{LIST }a
return KBSa , {LIST }a, {CellMateList}a
en-route-filtering scheme presented in [22] is implemented
by the authentication cells di belonging to each particular
cell (c) to reduce the amount of fake reports arriving at
the BS. This is implemented using the authentication keys
Kdic derived by the BS. Hence, the computation cost is
decreased dramatically in comparison with the cost of LEDS
and MKMP, as shown in section (IV-B), where the nodes are
responsible about the derivation of authentication keys.
The modified setup phase presented in this paper is de-
signed to overcome the drawbacks in [14] such as the high
computation cost, data confidentiality and data authenticity
vulnerabilities and the absence of an appropriate revocation
scheme. To address the first point, the computational cost
required to calculate the cell centre can be reduced by up-
loading ∆ , which removes the required calculations for grid
integer determination shown in [14](2). In addition, KBSa
is confidential when it is generated only by node a, where
both its identity IDa and location (xa, ya) are involved in
this key derivation. The authenticity of the HELLO message
shown in Algorithm 2 is guaranteed due to its encryption by
KLCin , which thwarts any possible attack. Moreover, as the
main part of a revocation scheme, the detection of suspicious
nodes/cells is included. Finally, the setup phase explains the
derivation of both the IDc and the Kdic as the main part of
en-route filtering. Hence, this paper presents a more realistic
setup phase in comparison to that presented in [14].
E. Report Generation
The event report R, which includes the cell ID, event lo-
cation and event type, is generated depending on all n sensor
nodes inside the particular cell (c) using the signal strength
strategy presented in [23]. Due to the packet encryption by
KLC , R, it is difficult for outside attackers to obtain R.
However, the attackers could inject fabricated information
or create a forged event, so some type of endorsement needs
to be embedded inside the generated reports.
For LKMP-RSCR, three kinds of endorsement must be
included in the report for verification: uniqueness of the
Algorithm 3 The BS verification of {LIST }a packages sent
by each node
Input: {LIST }a : a = 1, 2..., N
COUNT = 0;SuspNodes ≡ φ
for a = 1, 2..., N do
BS extracts IDa from the header of {LIST }a
KBSa ← H(K∥IDa∥(x0, y0))
DecKBS
a
{LIST }a = {((xc, yc), IDlist,KLcin}
IDc = 10xc + yc
Num = Length{LIST }a
if {LIST }a ≡ {LIST }a−1 then
COUNT ++
else
SuspNodes← a
end if
end for
if COUNT ≥ ⌊0.5Num⌋+ 1 then
Call Algorithm(4)
else
if COUNT < ⌊0.5Num⌋+ 1 then
SuspCells← IDc
Call Algorithm(5)
end if
else
KLc ≡ KLc init
{LIST }c = {LIST }a ∪ IDa
BS → a : EncKBS
a
{KLc, {LIST }c}
if BS ← a : ACK then
Kdic = H(KLc∥KLdi∥(xdi , ydi)∥(xc, yc))
BS → a ∈ c : {di} ∪ {Kdic }
end if
end if
return KBSa , SuspNodes, SuspCells,KLc, {LIST }c
, {di}, {Kdic }
individual data received from each node in the event cell,
the message authentication code (MAC) generated by the
authentication nodes and the cell reporter signature. The
first endorsement is achieved by using the fundamentals
of an (e, n) threshold linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS)
[24]. The uniqueness of the KBSa key shared between each
particular cell and the BS is used to derive a unique node
share Ca from the encrypted event report C = EKLC{R}:
Ca = C
∑
0≤i≤e−1
(KBSa )
i mod p, (1)
Obviously, Ca is generated uniquely by node a depending
on its unique key KBSa which is shared with the BS only.
Moreover, each node inside cell (c) broadcasts its share, as
a tuble {Ca, a} to all its cell-mates. As a result, a total of
n− 1 shares are collected by each node and concatenated:
Cnew = C1∥C2...∥Cn (2)
The second endorsement of the report consists of multiple
MACs calculated over Cnew. These MACs are derived
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using the authentication keys dedicated and broadcast to
each node by the BS (Algorithm 3). For example, in the
case of dedicating two authentication cells d1 and d2 as
intermediate cells between cell (c) and the BS, each node
inside (c) broadcasts the following to its cell-mates.
MACKLc{C,MACKd1c (Cnew),MACKd2c (Cnew)}
When node (a) receives different i(n − 1) MACs, where
i refers to the number of authentication cells, it sends a
synthesized report containing the ID of all cell-mates and
the hosting cell, Cnew and i MACs, shared with each authen-
tication cell. A random timer scheme [17] is used to avoid
report duplication. Based on the enclosed MACs, the en-route
filtering scheme is implemented by each authentication cell.
Due to space limitation, this scheme is not presented and the
same procedure of [10] is followed. The third and the most
important endorsement from LKMP-RSCR is the signature
of the set of z cell reporters randomly selected out of a total
of n cell nodes by the BS.
This set is changed every 1
T
seconds, where T is a predefined
cell reporter validity which may be changeable based on mul-
tiple parameters like data importance, estimated frequency of
attacks and rhythm of event occurrences. The participation of
the cell reporter signatures in the report generation overcomes
the major security limitations in recent schemes. As described
in section (I-A), the capture of a threshold number of nodes in
a particular cell enables the adversary to generate fake reports
that might deceive all verification process of the intermediate
cell and the BS. Therefore, the received packet from the BS
in LKMP-RSCR is accepted if and only if all cell reporters
are involved in the report generation.
F. Key Revocation
In this section, the required key revocation schemes are
explained to overcome the possible risk caused by nodes
or cells listed in previously created SusbNodes, SusbCells
lists. These schemes are crucial to prevent the compromised
nodes/cells from starting any correspondences with other
nodes in the network. Moreover, such a scheme is important
to thwart colluding between compromised nodes. For all
nodes ∈ SusbNodes list, the BS call Algorithm (4) to revoke
their credentials as shown below.
On the other hand, Algorithm (5) is called by the BS
regarding each cell sc ∈ SusbCells:
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF LKMP-RSCR
An analysis of the security of our system is presented based
on three aspects. The first aspect is the system’s capability
of thwarting typical routing attacks while the second aspect
is related to the role of the number of cell reporters (z) in
the security of each particular cell. Finally, the third aspect
is a revision of the wireless security requirements for data
confidentiality, availability and authenticity derived in [14].
The outcome of the last two aspects is the cornerstone of
section V, which investigates the optimum value of (z).
Algorithm 4 Revocation of suspicious node (s) located
inside a cell (c) implemented by the BS
Input: IDs ∈ SusbNodes, IDc,KLc,Kdic : i = 1, 2...t
{LIST }new = ∀IDa(IDa ∈ {LIST }c
∧
IDa ̸= IDc)
KLc new ← H((xc, yc∥ts∥{LIST }new)
Kdic = H(KLc new∥KLdi∥(xdi , ydi)∥(xc, yc))
for ∀a(a ∈ {LIST }new do
BS → a : {KLc new, IDc,Kdic : i = 1, 2...t}
end for
RemoveKBSc
return {LIST }new,KLc new,Kdic : i = 1, 2...t}
Algorithm 5 Revocation of suspicious cell (sc) implemented
by the BS
Input: IDsc,KLsc,Kdisc : i = 1, 2...t
Remove KBSsc
for ∀di : i = 1, 2...t do
Remove Kdisc}
end for
A. System Robustness Against Routing Attacks
As presented earlier, LKMP-RSCR uses the node positions
to derive the security credentials required to protect both
cell-by-cell communication and the required correspondence
between cell-mates. Hence, our scheme is secure enough to
thwart almost all typical attacks such as node replication,
HELLO flooding, black hole, wormhole, Sybil and selective
forwarding attacks.
B. The impact of z value on the security of each particular
cell
The assumption of our LKMP-RSCR protocol ensures the
validity of any received report depending on three aspects: the
endorsement of e sensor nodes, MAC authentication nodes
and the participation of z cell reporters. While the impor-
tance of the first two aspects are well investigated in [14],
which are reviewed in following sections, this section will
investigate the importance of the value of z in determining
the probability of compromised cells. The probability of an
adversary compromising all z cell reporters inside a cell that
contains n nodes can be calculated using the compromising
strategy illustrated in the following example: Assume that
z = 3 and n = 10:
The adversary has a:
1) probability of P (E1) = 3
10
to compromise all z cell
reporters in her 1st trial.
2) probability of P (E2) = 2
9
to compromise the remain-
ing 2 cell reporters from the remaining 9 nodes in the
2nd trial.
3) probability of P (E3) = 1
8
to compromise the last cell
reporter from the remaining 8 nodes in the 3rd trial.
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The probability of compromising all 3 cell reporters in a row
is:
P = P (E1)P (E2)P (E3) =
1
120
This can be generalised as
follows:
Pz comp =(
z
n
)(
z − 1
n− 1)(
z − 2
n− 2)...(
1
n− z + 1)
Pz comp =
z(z − 1)(z − 2)...(1)
n(n− 1)(n− 2)...(n− z + 1)
=
(z!)(n− z)!
n!
(3)
The above mentioned equation is describing the relationship
between the probability of compromising a particular cell
and the number of its cell reporters (z). This equation has
a vital importance while it is the cornerstone that is used to
determine the optimum value of z as shown in section V.
C. Security Strength Regarding Data Confidentiality
The content of the generated report by an event cell is
only revealed to its nodes because it is encrypted by the cell
key KLc owned by them. This guarantees data confidentiality
even when a number of intermediate nodes are compromised.
However, if one of the nodes involved in report generation
is compromised, the report contents could be revealed. In
order to understand the security strength in this case, the
effect of a random node capture attack (RNCA) on the entire
system has been investigated by determining the probability
of compromising all cells due to RNCA in [14].
PC{e|z} =
(
1−
(
N−e
x
)
(
N
x
)
)(
1−
(
N−z
x
)
(
N
x
)
)
(4)
For different values of z, the percentage of captured cells
concerning data confidentiality in terms of the number of
compromised nodes is shown in Fig. 2. The security of
LKMP-RSCR in terms of data confidentiality is observed
to decrease with increasing values of z. Moreover, for all
z values, the MKMP-RSCR outperforms MKMP, which is
significantly superior to LEDS in terms of confidentiality as
presented in [14], [18]. This observed improvement varies
according to the z value. In particular, for three values of z
(1,2,3) the improvement is 95%, 90% and 85% respectively
when 1000 nodes are compromised. This is due to the ability
of the adversary to disclose event contents in the case of
compromising one of the e endorsement nodes in MKMP
and LEDS, whereas in our new scheme the data is disclosed
if and only if the entire set of z cell reporters and all e
endorsement nodes are captured. On the other hand, the
improvement drops to 75%, 57% and 43% when the number
of compromised nodes increased to 5000 due to the increase
in the probability of compromising the entire set of cell
reporters when more nodes are compromised.
D. Security Strength for Data Authenticity
Data authenticity in a particular cell is compromised if the
attacker creates a forged report as a result of capturing some
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Figure 2: Data confidentiality of LKMP-RSCR and MKMP
under random capture attack
sensor nodes. To show the security strength of our scheme, a
formula to calculate the probability of all compromised cells
in terms of data authenticity was derived in [14]:
Pauth{e|z} =
e∑
j=1
(
e
j
)(
N−e
x−j
)
(
N
x
) z∑
j=1
(
z
j
)(
N−z
x−j
)
(
N
x
) (5)
The fraction of captured cells increase with the number
of captured nodes as shown in Fig. 3, showing that LKMP-
RSCR clearly outperforms MKMP in terms of data authentic-
ity for all values of x. To be more precise, an enhancement
of (49%, 24%, 12.5%) is gained using our approach with
z = 1, 2, 3 respectively when half of all nodes are com-
promised. However, LKMP-RSCR shows an improvement in
comparison to LEDS only for higher values of x. Hence, It
outperform LEDS when (x ≥ 4000, x ≥ 7000, x ≥ 10000)
and z = 1, 2, 3 respectively. As a result, LKMP-RSCR is
superior compared to the other schemes in terms of the
fraction of compromised cells caused by RNCA thwarting
data authenticity, especially when 50% of the nodes are
captured.
IV. COST ANALYSIS
In this section, both the communication and computational
cost of LKMP-RSCR are investigated and compared with
other schemes. For communication cost, the LKMP-RSCR
dissemination model has been compared with models of
two-tier data dissemination TTDD and sink-oriented data
dissemination SODD [25] in addition to LEDS and MKMP.
Also, a brief description of the computation cost is given,
which is lower than other schemes due to the assumption of
the wide coverage of the BS.
A. Communication cost
A square terrain of size A is assumed, while nodes are
uniformly distributed, number of nodes deployed on each
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Figure 3: Probability of compromising all cells in terms of data authenticity of LKMP-RSCR, MKMP and LEDS under
RNCA
side (≈ √N). The size of each packet constituting the gen-
erated report, acknowledgement message and bootstrapping
correspondences are assumed to be of a fixed size (λ). The
cost related to bootstrapping phase is considered for the entire
network. Then a cost caused by a single cell report generation
in a worst case scenario is assumed.
During the bootstrapping phase, all N nodes send their
{LIST }a as described in Algorithm 2. The communication
cost of this phase is Nλ which is similar to that for LEDS and
MKMP. On the other hand, the communication cost related
to BS acknowledgement is λ in LKMP-RSCR. In contrast,
it is Nλ in LEDS and MKMP.
On the other hand, to generate a report by a particular cell,
all n nodes are participating, so that, the communication cost
is nλ. This is similar to the cost of LEDS and MKMP. In
contrast, BS acknowledgement communication cost is λ due
to single hop scheme followed in LKMP-RSCR. In contrast,
the BS acknowledgement cost in LEDS and MKMP is√
2Nλ. As a result, communication cost might be expressed
as following:
CCLKMP−RSCR = λ(N +
√
2N + n+ 1) (6)
CCLEDS = λ(2N + 2
√
2N + n) (7)
CCMKMP = kλ(2N + 2
√
2N +
n
k
) (8)
Moreover, according to [25]:
CCSODD = Nλ+
4N√
n
λ+ kmnι+ kc(mλ+ d)
√
2N (9)
CCTTDD = kmNλ+ kcd
√
N (10)
Where, according to the specifications of systems shown in
[18], [25] k is the number of BS, m is the number of cells
traversed by each mobile BS, 0 ≤ c ≤√2 and d is the number
of data packets received from a particular cell per time. To
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Figure 4: Communication cost of LKMP-RSCR, LEDS,
MKMP, TODD and SODD,d=100 packet, l=1 packet
keep comparison consistency between different schemes, a
single stationary BS is assumed (k,m = 1).
B. Computational cost
In comparison to LEDS and MKMP, the security credential
derivation and virtual grid construction is facilitated by the
LKMP-RSCR assumption of the BS’s wide coverage. This al-
low the BS to implement the mentioned derivation rather than
their implementation by each particular node. In contrast, in
the MKMP scheme, the authentication keys shared with the
relevant authentication nodes are derived individually by each
node. On the other hand, these derivations are implemented
by a robot in LEDS which is an impractical assumption,
especially in a harsh environment. Hence, less computation is
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required to be implemented by each node when employing
LKMP-RSCR. This is one of the major advantages of our
scheme.
V. OPTIMUM NUMBER OF CELL REPORTERS
In order to guarantee the optimality of the proposed sys-
tem, the following sections investigate the optimum number
of cell reporters.
A. Mathematical Analysis
In this section, the optimum number of cell reporters z
will be investigated based on the expressions PC{e|z} and
Pauth{e|z} given in (4) and (5) respectively. The calculated
value must minimize (Pc) and (Pauth). Both expressions
comprise two parts: the first part is constant in terms of
z while the second part varies. Hence, the set of optimum
values of zopt can be expressed as:
zmin = argmin
z
⎛
⎝ z∑
j=1
(
z
j
)(
N−z
x−j
)
(
N
x
)
⎞
⎠∩argmin
z
(
1−
(
N−z
x
)
(
N
x
)
)
(11)
Obviously, z = 1 is the minimum value according to
summation limits of the first part. However, the second part
of the equation above shows that z ≤ N − x. As a result,
zmin = 1 and zmax = N − x and this leads to
Pc|zmin =
x
N
(
1−
(
N−e
x
)
(
N
x
)
)
(12)
Pc|zmax =
N !− x!(N − x)!
N !
(
1−
(
N−e
x
)
(
N
x
)
)
(13)
Pauth|zmin =
x
N
e∑
j=1
(
e
j
)(
N−e
x−j
)
(
N
x
) (14)
Pauth|zmax =
N−x∑
j=1
(
N−x
j
)(
x
x−j
)
(
N
x
) e∑
j=1
(
e
j
)(
N−e
x−j
)
(
N
x
) (15)
For more clarification on the optimum number of cell
reporters, Pc is plotted as a function of z as shown in Fig. 5.
The range of z values, which maintain a value of Pc lower
than 0.3%, are investigated. It is obvious that Pc significantly
increases as the values of z increase. The increment rate is
changed depending on the amount of compromised nodes
x. When x is equal to one tenth of the total number of
nodes inside the network, number of cell reporters can varies
between 1 and 4, (z ∈ [1, 4]) while Pc < 0.3%. On the other
hand, when the number of compromised nodes is halved, the
range of cell reporter numbers is wider, so that z can be
selected to be 6 while the value of Pc is kept below 0.3%.
The same analysis is shown in Fig. 6 where the value of
Pauth is proportional to the number of cell reporters. Next
the optimality of z in terms of cell capturing and its effect
on the integrity of generated reports is investigated.
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Figure 5: The relationship between number of cell reporters
(z) and the percentage of compromised cells in terms of data
confidentiality Pc
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Figure 6: The relationship between number of cell reporters
(z) and the percentage of compromised cells in terms of data
authenticity Pauth
B. Optimal value of z in terms of the security of a particular
cell
As shown in Fig. 8, Pz comp approaches zero if z lies
within a specific range. These values are referred to as
∆z, which is varied based on the value of n. This figure
proves two important aspects: the first aspect is related to the
optimum value of z, which is clearly indicated. The second
aspect is related to the relationship between the value of n
and ∆z. This proves that when n increases, the range of
optimum values of z increases, which offers considerable
flexibility for the system operator. For instance, when the
number of nodes inside a cell is 10, the operator has to
choose the number of cell reporters z ∈ [3, 7] to ensure a very
low probability of compromised cells. On the other hand, the
operator can choose z ∈ [2, 28] when n = 30 and be sure
of the same compromised cell probability (P ≤ 0.01). To
be more precise about the optimal value of z, we investigate
the minimum point for each graph in Fig. 7 and find the
IEEE SENSORS JOURNAL , VOL. X, NO. X, JANUARY 2016 9
optimum value of z:
zopt = argmin
z
{
(z!)(n− z)!
n!
}
∂
∂z
(z!)(n− z)! = 0
(n− z)!Γ(z + 1)ψ0(z + 1)
= z!Γ(n− z + 1)ψ0(n− z + 1)
ψ0(z + 1) = ψ0(n− z + 1)
(16)
While ψm(x) is a monotonic function [26]:
z =
n
2
(17)
It is clear that (17) represents a critical point for Pzcomp,
so the first derivative test is applied. The selected points to
implement this test are (0 ∈ (−∞, n2 )) and (n ∈ (n2 ,∞)). In
order to test these two points, the first derivative of Pzcomp
is calculated.
∂
∂z
(Pz comp) =
∂
∂z
z!(n− z)!
n!
=
1
n!
[(n− z)!Γ(z + 1)ψ0(z + 1)−
z!Γ(n− z + 1)ψ0(n− z + 1)] (18)
As a result, at z = 0
∂
∂z
(z!)(n− z)!/n!|z=0 = n!Γ(1)ψ
0(1)
n!
− Γ(n+ 1)ψ
0(n+ 1)]
n!
= ψ0(1)− ψ0(n+ 1) (19)
On the other hand, when z = n:
∂
∂z
(z!)(n− z)!/n!|z=n =Γ(n+ 1)ψ
0(n+ 1)
n!
− n!Γ(1)ψ
0(1)]
n!
=ψ0(n+ 1)− Γ(1)ψ0(1) (20)
According to the proof shown in Appendix A, the expression
of (20) is positive for all n, x ∈ R+. Moreover, the expression
of (19) is negative for all n, x ∈ R+. Hence, the unique
minimum point of (Pz comp) is z = n2 . As an example,
three different values of n are chosen as 10, 20 and 30.
The resultant optimum value of z are obviously 5, 10 and
15 respectively. This is shown in Fig. 7.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel location-dependent key management
protocol with a randomly selected cell reporter (LKMP-
RSCR) is presented and is shown to achieve an improved
performance compared to existing schemes. Each node has
its unique credentials derived based on its position, which
removes the influence of the capturing of a node on other
sensor nodes in its vicinity. Each cell has a particular number
of cell reporters z which are randomly chosen by the BS.
The involvement of cell reporters in report generation is
compulsory, otherwise, the received report at the BS side will
be discarded. An extensive analysis was presented to evaluate
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Figure 7: The relationship between number of cell reporters
(z) and the probability of compromising all cell reporters
inside a cell of 10, 20 and 30 nodes
this scheme, which shows a distinct robustness against a
significant numbers of captured nodes. In contrast to other
schemes, our system shows a considerable improvement in
terms of data confidentiality (85%) and data authenticity
(35%). Moreover, there is a notable decrease in the com-
putational cost inside each node and communication cost
inside the entire network. Finally, the optimum number of cell
reporters was extensively investigated related to the security
requirements, which was proven to be z = n
2
.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF ψm(n+ 1) ≥ ψm(1)
For all n, x ∈ R+:
xn ≥ 1
xne−x ≥ e−x
According to domination rule for definite integration [27]∫ ∞
0
xne−xdx ≥
∫ ∞
0
e−xdx∫ ∞
0
x(n+1)−1e−xdx ≥
∫ ∞
0
x0e−xdx∫ ∞
0
x(n+1)−1e−xdx ≥
∫ ∞
0
x1−1e−xdx
Γ(n+ 1) ≥ Γ(1)
lnΓ(n+ 1) ≥ lnΓ(1)
∂m
∂zm
lnΓ(n+ 1) ≥ ∂
m
∂zm
lnΓ(1)
ψm(n+ 1) ≥ ψm(1)" (21)
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